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RIGHT OF A CORPORATION TO SEND GOODS ON
CONSIGNMENT INTO A STATE IN WHICH
IT HAS NO PERMIT TO DO BUSINESS
The conflicting decisions as to the right of a corporation sending
goods on consignment for sale into a state in which it has no permit
to do business to invoke the protection of the constitution against
state interference, are based on two well established principles:
1. A state may exclude a foreign corporation from doing busi-
ness within its limits or may grant such corporation a license to do
business upon such terms and conditions as it thinks proper to
impose.'
2. Every corporation empowered to engage in interstate com-
merce by the state in which it is created may carry on interstate com-
merce in every state of the union free from every prohibition and
condition imposed by the latter.2
In order to determine which rule to apply, the logical inquiry
would seem to be whether the facts of the case present a transac-
tion of commerce between the states or a transaction wholly within
one state. As the question always arises, however, in the application
of a state statute requiring foreign corporations doing business within
the state to comply with certain regulations and depriving such cor-
poration of all rights and privileges to do business in the state or to
bring any action in any court of the state until they comply with the
state regulations, the courts are inclined to regard the question as to
whether or not the foreign corporation is doing business within the
state as decisive,3 or to consider the test of interstate commerce and
the test of doing business in the state as interchangeable.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Parlin & Orendorff, 118 Ky.
168, the court, upon finding that the contract between the parties
constituted an agency and was not a selling by owners as wholesalers
to alleged agents as retailers. Held, that the corporation had an
established place of business in Kentucky, and was therefore subject
to the state statute regulating foreign corporations. The right of a
foreign corporation to make sales through traveling salesmen or by
1Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168.2Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1; Cooper Mnfg.
Co. v. Fergusen, 113 U. S. 727.3Bertha Zinc and Mineral Co. v. Chute, 7 Misc. (N. Y.) 123; People
ex rel Collier v. Roberts, 25 App. Div. (N. Y.) 13.
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correspondence, or otherwise than through an agent at an established
place for conducting such business, without interference on the part
of the state is conceded.4 In such cases the corporation has no estab-
lished place of business in the state and the transacti6ns belong
wholly to interstate commerce. But here the employment of a resi-
dent agent to whom goods are shipped on consignment is regarded
as equivalent to establishing a place of business within the state and
carrying on business thereat. The reasoning of the court seems to
be that, having determined that the transaction amounted to doing
business within the state, the question as to its being interstate com-
merce could no longer arise.
Similar reasoning supports the decisiorm in Thomas Mfg Co. v.
Knapp, 101 Minn. 432, where an Ohio corporation was not per-
mitted to maintain a suit in Minnesota because of failure to comply.
with regulations imposed by statute on foreign corporations doing
business within the state. The interstate commerce clause of the
constitution was held not to apply in cases where a foreign corpora-
tion maintains a resident agent in the state whose business it is to
solicit orders for and deliver the goods of the 'corporation to the
purchaser. In the words of the court: "A distinction must be made
between acts of a foreign corporation shipping its goods to a com-
mission merchant or other agent within a state to be sold by him
and the proceeds accounted for to the corporation, the title of the
goods to remain in the corporation until paid for, and the case where
a local commission merchant solicits orders for t*he goods of a for-
eign corporation and forwards them directly to the corporation-in
the former case the corporation has established an agency and is
doing business in the state."
The case of Butler Bros. Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 132
Fed. 398, is cited to support the decision in Thomas v. Knapp, supra.
The Federal court, however, in reviewing the Butler case, reversed
its decision 5 and decided that the contract of a foreign corporation
to send goods on consignment to an agent in a state where it has
no permit to do business was a transaction of interstate commerce
and could not be controlled by state statutes. The contract upon
which the suit was brought by the United States Rubber Co., a
foreign corporation, provided that the corporation would ship shoes
and rubber goods from its factories in Eastern states to the shoe
company in Colorado; that the latter would make such advances to
4Stewart v. People of State of Mich., 232 U. S. 665.
5Butler Brothers Shoe Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1.
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the corporation as it requested and would conduct the business and
pay all the expenses of selling the goods for the factorage on com-
mission, which consisted in the difference between the prices agreed
upon by the parties to the contract and the selling prices to the
purchasers from the factor. The suit was defended on the ground
that the foreign corporation had not complied with the local statute,
which contained, among other requirements, the payment of a tax.
In regard to the contention that the rubber goods ceased to be arti-
cles of interstate commerce and became part of the mass of property
in the state upon their delivery to the assignee, the court says:
"The soundness of this contention is not conceded. But, if it were,
neither that concession nor the numerous authorities upon the taxa-
tion of property in the state would be either decisive or persuasive
here, for the question is not whether or not the goods were taxable
within the state, but whether or not the state could lawfully prohibit
their importation and annul all contracts therefor."
The important question in the view of this court is whether the
contracts between the foreign corporation and resident agent are
transaction of interstate commerce. That the contract in question
did not evidence the sales of the goods is not decisive. "All sales
of sound articles of commerce which necessitate transportation from
one state to another are interstate commerce, but all interstate com-
merce is not sales of goods. Importation from one state to another
is the indispensible element, the test of interstate commerce, and
every negotiation, trade or dealing between citizens of different
states which contemplates and causes such importation, whether it
be of goods, persons or information, is a transaction of interstate
commerce."
Applying this test to the factorage contract, it is perceived that
they clearly constitute interstate commerce, for their chief purpose
and effect were the importation of sound articles of commerce into
the state of Colorado from other states. Having determined that
the contracts for the assignment of goods by a foreign corporation
to an agent in Colorado were transactions of interstate commerce
it was not necessary to consider whether the foreign corporation by
making such contracts might be said to carry on business in the
state of Colorado. The court maintained, however, that the foreign
corporation was not doing business in Colorado. The goods when
delivered to the commission agent were entirely in his possession and
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control, and the disposal and sale of them were the business of the
factor and not of the foreign corporation.
While the decision of the Federal court in Atlas Engine Co. v.
Parkinson, 161 Fed. 223, is practically in harmony with the decision
in Butler Bros. v. U. S. Rubber Co., supra, it was there held that
the foreign corporation was doing business in the state and were the
question of interstate commerce not involved, it would not be per-
mitted to maintain a suit upon a contract with the local agent until
it fulfilled the requirements of the local statutes respecting foreign
corporations doing business within the state. But as it was held
that the contract provided for carrying on commerce between the
states and clearly related to interstate commerce, the provisions of
the state statute could not apply.
The weight of authority is undoubtedly on the side of the Federal
and state decisions which hold that the foreign corporation which
sends goods on consignment to an agent in another state, is engaged
in importing goods from one state to another and that such trans-
actions relate to interstate commerce. These decisions, however,
only cover' the cases in which the contract is made with an actual
factor, who provides for the storage of goods and defrays all ex-
penses connected with the disposal of them and whose profits are in-
the form of commissions. When the contract between the foreign
corporation and the local agent provides for the establishment of a
local branch to be maintained by the corporation through the local
agent, it cannot be regarded as an interstate commerce transaction.7
In such a case the corporation is carrying on a local business in the
state and is subject to the control of the state.
C. B.
GAllen v. Tysur-Jones, 91 Texas 22.
lFarrand Co. v. Walker, 160 Mo. App. 602.
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